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Abstract
The detection of offensive language in the con-
text of a dialogue has become an increasingly
important application of natural language pro-
cessing. The detection of trolls in public fo-
rums (Gala´n-Garcı´a et al., 2016), and the de-
ployment of chatbots in the public domain
(Wolf et al., 2017) are two examples that show
the necessity of guarding against adversarially
offensive behavior on the part of humans. In
this work, we develop a training scheme for a
model to become robust to such human attacks
by an iterative build it, break it, fix it strategy
with humans and models in the loop. In de-
tailed experiments we show this approach is
considerably more robust than previous sys-
tems. Further, we show that offensive lan-
guage used within a conversation critically de-
pends on the dialogue context, and cannot be
viewed as a single sentence offensive detection
task as in most previous work. Our newly col-
lected tasks and methods will be made open
source and publicly available.
1 Introduction
The detection of offensive language has become
an important topic as the online community has
grown, as so too have the number of bad actors
(Cheng et al., 2017). Such behavior includes, but
is not limited to, trolling in public discussion fo-
rums (Herring et al., 2002) and via social media
(Silva et al., 2016; Davidson et al., 2017), employ-
ing hate speech that expresses prejudice against
a particular group, or offensive language specif-
ically targeting an individual. Such actions can
be motivated to cause harm from which the bad
actor derives enjoyment, despite negative conse-
quences to others (Bishop, 2014). As such, some
bad actors go to great lengths to both avoid detec-
tion and to achieve their goals (Shachaf and Hara,
2010). In that context, any attempt to automat-
ically detect this behavior can be expected to be
adversarially attacked by looking for weaknesses
in the detection system, which currently can eas-
ily be exploited as shown in (Hosseini et al., 2017;
Gro¨ndahl et al., 2018). A further example, rele-
vant to the natural langauge processing commu-
nity, is the exploitation of weaknesses in machine
learning models that generate text, to force them
to emit offensive language. Adversarial attacks
on the Tay chatbot led to the developers shutting
down the system (Wolf et al., 2017).
In this work, we study the detection of offen-
sive language in dialogue with models that are ro-
bust to adversarial attack. We develop an auto-
matic approach to the “Build it Break it Fix it”
strategy originally adopted for writing secure pro-
grams (Ruef et al., 2016), and the “Build it Break
it” approach consequently adapting it for NLP (Et-
tinger et al., 2017). In the latter work, two teams of
researchers, “builders” and “breakers” were used
to first create sentiment and semantic role-labeling
systems and then construct examples that find their
faults. In this work we instead fully automate such
an approach using crowdworkers as the humans-
in-the-loop, and also apply a fixing stage where
models are retrained to improve them. Finally, we
repeat the whole build, break, and fix sequence
over a number of iterations.
We show that such an approach provides more
and more robust systems over the fixing iterations.
Analysis of the type of data collected in the itera-
tions of the break it phase shows clear distribution
changes, moving away from simple use of profan-
ity and other obvious offensive words to utterances
that require understanding of world knowledge,
figurative language, and use of negation to detect
if they are offensive or not. Further, data collected
in the context of a dialogue rather than a sentence
without context provides more sophisticated at-
tacks. We show that model architectures that use
the dialogue context efficiently perform much bet-
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ter than systems that do not, where the latter has
been the main focus of existing research (Wulczyn
et al., 2017; Davidson et al., 2017; Zampieri et al.,
2019).
Code for our entire build it, break it, fix it al-
gorithm will be made open source, complete with
model training code and crowdsourcing interface
for humans. Our data and trained models will also
be made available for the community.
2 Related Work
The task of detecting offensive language has been
studied across a variety of content classes. Perhaps
the most commonly studied class is hate speech,
but work has also covered bullying, aggression,
and toxic comments (Zampieri et al., 2019).
To this end, various datasets have been created
to benchmark progress in the field. In hate speech
detection, recently Davidson et al. (2017) com-
piled and released a dataset of over 24,000 tweets
labeled as containing hate speech, offensive lan-
guage, or neither. The TRAC shared task on Ag-
gression Identification, a dataset of over 15,000
Facebook comments labeled with varying levels
of aggression, was released as part of a compe-
tition (Kumar et al., 2018). In order to benchmark
toxic comment detection, The Wikipedia Toxic
Comments dataset (which we study in this work)
was collected and extracted from Wikipedia Talk
pages and featured in a Kaggle competition (Wul-
czyn et al., 2017; Google, 2018). Each of these
benchmarks examine only single-turn utterances,
outside of the context in which the language ap-
peared. In this work we recommend that future
systems should move beyond classification of sin-
gular utterances and use contextual information to
help identify offensive language.
Many approaches have been taken to solve these
tasks – from linear regression and SVMs to deep
learning (Noever, 2018). The best performing sys-
tems in each of the competitions mentioned above
(for aggression and toxic comment classification)
used deep learning approaches such as LSTMs and
CNNs (Kumar et al., 2018; Google, 2018). In this
work we consider a large-pretrained transformer
model which has been shown to perform well on
many downstream NLP tasks (Devlin et al., 2018).
The broad class of adversarial training is cur-
rently a hot topic in machine learning (Goodfel-
low et al., 2014). Use cases include training im-
age generators (Brock et al., 2018) as well as im-
age classifiers to be robust to adversarial examples
(Liu et al., 2019). These methods find the break-
ing examples algorithmically, rather than by us-
ing humans breakers as we do. Applying the same
approaches to NLP tends to be more challenging
because, unlike for images, even small changes to
a sentence can cause a large change in the mean-
ing of that sentence, which a human can detect but
a lower quality model cannot. Nevertheless algo-
rithmic approaches have been attempted, for ex-
ample in text classification (Ebrahimi et al., 2018),
machine translation (Belinkov and Bisk, 2018), di-
alogue generation tasks (Li et al., 2017) and read-
ing comprehension (Jia and Liang, 2017). The lat-
ter was particularly effective at proposing a more
difficult version of the popular SQuAD dataset.
As mentioned in the introduction, our approach
takes inspiration from “Build it Break it” ap-
proaches which have been successfully tried in
other domains (Ruef et al., 2016; Ettinger et al.,
2017). Those approaches advocate finding faults
in systems by having humans look for insecurities
(in software) or prediction failures (in models), but
do not advocate an automated approach as we do
here. Our work is also closely connected to the
“Mechanical Turker Descent” algorithm detailed
in (Yang et al., 2018) where language to action
pairs were collected from crowdworkers by incen-
tivizing them with a game-with-a-purpose tech-
nique: a crowdworker receives a bonus if their
contribution results in better models than another
crowdworker. We did not gamify our approach
in this way, but still our approach has common-
alities in the round-based improvement of models
through crowdworker interaction.
3 Baselines: Wikipedia Toxic Comments
In this section we describe the publicly available
data that we have used to bootstrap our build it
break it fix it approach. We also compare our
model choices with existing work and clarify the
metrics chosen to report our results.
Wikipedia Toxic Comments The Wikipedia
Toxic Comments dataset (WTC) has been col-
lected in a common effort from the Wikimedia
Foundation and Jigsaw (Wulczyn et al., 2017) to
identify personal attacks online. The data has
been extracted from the Wikipedia Talk pages, dis-
cussion pages where editors can discuss improve-
ments to articles or other Wikipedia pages. We
considered the version of the dataset that corre-
sponds to the Kaggle competition: “Toxic Com-
ment Classification Challenge” (Google, 2018)
which features 7 classes of toxicity: toxic, se-
vere toxic, obscene, threat, insult, identity hate and
non-toxic. In the same way as in (Khatri et al.,
2018), every label except non-toxic is grouped into
a class OFFENSIVE while the non-toxic class is
kept as the SAFE class. In order to compare our
results to (Khatri et al., 2018), we similarly split
this dataset to dedicate 10% as a test set. 80% are
dedicated to train set while the remaining 10% is
used for validation. Statistics on the dataset are
shown in Table 1.
Models We establish baselines using two mod-
els. The first one is a binary classifier built on top
of a large pre-trained transformer model. We use
the same architecture as in BERT (Devlin et al.,
2018). We add a linear layer to the output of the
first token ([CLS]) to produce a final binary classi-
fication. We initialize the model using the weights
provided by (Devlin et al., 2018) corresponding
to “BERT-base”. The transformer is composed of
12 layers with hidden size of 768 and 12 atten-
tion heads. We fine-tune the whole network on the
classification task. We also compare it the fastText
classifier (Joulin et al., 2017) for which a given
sentence is encoded as the average of individual
word vectors that are pre-trained on a large cor-
pus issued from Wikipedia. A linear layer is then
applied on top to yield a binary classification.
Experiments We compare the two aforemen-
tioned models with (Khatri et al., 2018) who con-
ducted their experiments with a BiLSTM with
GloVe pre-trained word vectors (Pennington et al.,
2014). Results are listed in Table 2 and we com-
pare them using the weighted-F1, i.e. the sum
of F1 score of each class weighted by their fre-
quency in the dataset. We also report the F1 of
the OFFENSIVE-class which is the metric we fa-
vor within this work, although we report both.
(Note that throughout the paper, the notation F1
is always referring to OFFENSIVE-class F1.) In-
deed, in the case of an imbalanced dataset such
as Wikipedia Toxic Comments where most sam-
ples are SAFE, the weighted-F1 is closer to the F1
score of the SAFE class while we focus on detect-
ing OFFENSIVE content. Our BERT-based model
outperforms the method from Khatri et al. (2018);
throughout the rest of the paper, we use the BERT-
based architecture in our experiments. In particu-
Train Valid Test
SAFE 89.8% 89.7% 90.1%
OFFENSIVE 10.2% 10.3% 9.1%
Total 114656 15958 15957
Table 1: Dataset statistics for our splits of Wikipedia
Toxic Comments.
OFFENSIVE F1 Weighted F1
fastText 71.4% 94.8%
BERT-based 83.4% 96.7%
(Khatri et al., 2018) - 95.4%
Table 2: Comparison between our models based on
fastText and BERT with the BiLSTM used by (Khatri
et al., 2018) on Wikipedia Toxic Comments.
lar, we used this baseline trained on WTC to boot-
strap our approach, to be described subsequently.
4 Build it Break it Fix it Method
In order to train models that are robust to adver-
sarial behavior, we posit that it is crucial collect
and train on data that was collected in an adversar-
ial manner. We propose the following automated
build it, break it, fix it algorithm:
1. Build it: Build a model capable of detect-
ing OFFENSIVE messages. This is our best-
performing BERT-based model trained on
the Wikipedia Toxic Comments dataset de-
scribed in the previous section. We refer to
this model throughout as A0.
2. Break it: Ask crowdworkers to try to “beat
the system” by submitting messages that our
system (A0) marks as SAFE but that the
worker considers to be OFFENSIVE.
3. Fix it: Train a new model on these collected
examples in order to be more robust to these
adversarial attacks.
4. Repeat: Repeat, deploying the newly trained
model in the break it phase, then fix it again.
See Figure 1 for a visualization of this process.
4.1 Break it Details
Definition of OFFENSIVE Throughout data col-
lection, we characterize OFFENSIVE messages for
users as messages that would not be “ok to send
in a friendly conversation with someone you just
met online.” We use this specific language in an
A0
SAFE
OFFENSIVE
Build it 
Existing data
training
Not broken: try again!
Adversarial data
Broken: add to new dataset
training
prediction
deploy
deploy
Offensive Message
breaker
A0
A1
A0 + A1
Break it 
(ROUND 2) 
Fix it 
prediction
training
Offensive Message
breaker
Break it 
(ROUND 1) (ROUND 1) 
Figure 1: The build it, break it, fix it algorithm we use
to iteratively train better modelsA0, . . . , AN . In exper-
iments we perform N = 3 iterations of the break it, fix
it loop for the single-turn utterance detection task, and
a further iteration for the multi-turn task in a dialogue
context setting.
attempt to capture various classes of content that
would be considered unacceptable in a friendly
conversation, without imposing our own defini-
tions of what that means. The phrase “with some-
one you just met online” was meant to mimic the
setting of a public forum.
Crowderworker Task We ask crowdworkers to
try to “beat the system” by submitting messages
that our system marks as SAFE but that the worker
considers to be OFFENSIVE. For a given round,
workers earn a “game” point each time they are
able to “beat the system,” or in other words, trick
the model by submitting OFFENSIVE messages
that the model marks as SAFE. Workers earn up
to 5 points each round, and have two tries for each
point: we allow multiple attempts per point so that
workers can get feedback from the models and bet-
ter understand their weaknesses. The points serve
to indicate success to the crowdworker and mo-
tivate to achieve high scores, but have no other
meaning (e.g. no monetary value as in (Yang et al.,
2018)). More details regarding the user interface
and instructions can be found in Appendix B.
Models to Break During round 1, workers try to
break the baseline modelA0, trained on Wikipedia
Toxic Comments. For rounds i, i > 1, workers
must break both the baseline model and the model
from the previous “fix it” round, which we refer
to as Ai−1. In that case, the worker must submit
messages that both A0 and Ai−1 mark as SAFE but
which the worker considers to be OFFENSIVE.
4.2 Fix it Details
During the “fix it” round, we update the models
with the newly collected adversarial data from the
“break it” round.
The training data consists of all previous rounds
of data, so that model Ai is trained on all rounds
n for n ≤ i, as well as the Wikipedia Toxic Com-
ments data. We split each round of data into train,
validation, and test partitions. The validation set
is used for hyperparameter selection. The test sets
are used to measure how robust we are to new
adversarial attacks. With increasing round i, Ai
should become more robust to increasingly com-
plex human adversarial attacks.
5 Single-Turn Task
We first consider a single-turn set-up, i.e. detec-
tion of offensive language in one utterance, with
no dialogue context or conversational history.
5.1 Data Collection
Adversarial Collection We collected three
rounds of data with the build it, break it, fix it
algorithm described in the previous section. Each
round of data consisted of 1000 examples, leading
to 3000 single-turn adversarial examples in total.
For the remainder of the paper, we refer to this
method of data collection as the adversarial
method.
Standard Collection In addition to the adver-
sarial method, we also collected data in a non-
adversarial manner in order to directly compare
the two set-ups. In this method – which we refer
to as the standard method, we simply ask crowd-
workers to submit messages that they consider to
be OFFENSIVE. There is no model to break. In-
structions are otherwise the same.
In this set-up, there is no real notion of
“rounds”, but for the sake of comparison we re-
fer to each subsequent 1000 examples collected in
Single-Turn Adversarial (Round 1) and Standard Task OFFENSIVE Examples
contains non-profane contains contains requires contains
profanity offending words negation figurative language world knowledge sarcasm
Standard 13% 12% 12% 11% 8% 3%
Adversarial 0% 5% 23% 19% 14% 6%
Table 3: Language analysis of the single-turn standard and adversarial (round 1) tasks by human annotation of
various language properties. Standard collection examples contain more words found in an offensive words list,
while adversarial examples require more sophisticated language understanding.
this manner as a “round”. We collect 3000 exam-
ples – or three rounds of data. We refer to a model
trained on rounds n ≤ i of the standard data as Si.
5.1.1 Task Formulation Details
Since all of the collected examples are labeled as
OFFENSIVE, to make this task a binary classifica-
tion problem, we will also add SAFE examples to
it.
The “safe data” is comprised of utterances from
the ConvAI2 chit-chat task (Dinan et al., 2019;
Zhang et al., 2018) which consists of pairs of hu-
mans getting to know each other by discussing
their interests. Each utterance we used was re-
viewed by two independent crowdworkers and la-
beled as SAFE, with the same characterization of
SAFE as described before.
For each partition (train, validation, test), the fi-
nal task has a ratio of 9:1 SAFE to OFFENSIVE ex-
amples, mimicking the division of the Wikipedia
Toxic Comments dataset used for training our
baseline models. Dataset statistics for the final
task can be found in Table 5. We refer to these
tasks – with both SAFE and OFFENSIVE examples
– as the adversarial and standard tasks.
5.1.2 Model Training Details
Using the BERT-based model architecture de-
scribed in Section 3, we trained models on each
round of the standard and adversarial tasks,
multi-tasking with the Wikipedia Toxic Comments
task. We weight the multi-tasking with a mixing
parameter which is also tuned on the validation
set. Finally, after training weights with the cross
entropy loss, we adjust the final bias also using the
validation set. We optimize for the sensitive class
(i.e. OFFENSIVE-class) F1 metric on the standard
and adversarial validation sets respectively.
For each task (standard and adversarial), on
round i, we train on data from all rounds n for
n ≤ i and optimize for performance on the valida-
tion sets n ≤ i.
% with % with avg. # avg. #
profanity “not” chars tokens
Std. (Rnds 1-3) 18.2 2.8 48.6 9.4
Adv. Rnd 1 2.6 5.8 53.7 10.3
Adv. Rnd 2 1.5 5.5 44.5 9
Adv. Rnd 3 1.2 9.8 45.7 9.3
Multi-turn Adv. 1.6 4.9 36.6 7.8
Table 4: Percent of OFFENSIVE examples in each task
containing profanity, the token “not”, as well as the av-
erage number of characters and tokens in each exam-
ple. Rows 1-4 are the single-turn task, and the last row
is the multi-turn task. Later rounds have less profan-
ity and more use of negation as human breakers have
to find more sophisticated language to adversarially at-
tack our models.
Rounds {1, 2 and 3} Train Valid Test
SAFE Examples 21,600 2700 2700
OFFENSIVE Examples 2400 300 300
Total Examples 24,000 3,000 3,000
Table 5: Dataset statistics for the single-turn rounds of
the adversarial task data collection. There are three
rounds in total all of identical size, hence the numbers
above can be divided for individual statistics. The stan-
dard task is an additional dataset of exactly the same
size as above.
5.2 Experimental Results
We conduct experiments comparing the adversar-
ial and standard methods. We break down the re-
sults into “break it” results comparing the data col-
lected and “fix it” results comparing the models
obtained.
5.2.1 Break it Phase
Examples obtained from both the adversarial and
standard collection methods were found to be
clearly offensive, but we note several differences
in the distribution of examples from each task,
shown in Table 4. First, examples from the stan-
dard task tend to contain more profanity. Using a
list of common English obscenities and otherwise
WTC Baseline Standard models Adversarial models
Task Type Task Round A0 S1 S2 S3 A1 A2 A3
WTC - 83.3 80.6 81.1 82.1 81.3 78.9 78.0
Standard Task All (1-3) 68.1 83.3 85.8 88.0 83.0 85.3 83.7
Adversarial Task
1 0.0 51.7 69.3 68.6 71.8 79.0 78.2
2 0.0 10.8 26.4 31.8 0.0 64.4 62.1
3 0.0 12.3 17.1 13.7 32.1 0.0 59.9
All (1-3) 0.0 27.4 41.7 41.8 40.6 55.5 67.6
Table 6: Test performance of best standard models trained on standard task rounds (models Si for each round
i) and best adversarial models trained on adversarial task rounds (models Ai). All models are evaluated using
OFFENSIVE-class F1 on each round of both the standard task and adversarial task. A0 is the baseline model
trained on the existing Wiki Toxic Comments (WTC) dataset. Adversarial models prove to be more robust than
standard ones against attack (Adversarial Task 1-3), while still performing reasonably on Standard and WTC tasks.
bad words1, in Table 4 we calculate the percentage
of examples in each task containing such obscen-
ities, and see that the standard examples contain
at least seven times as many as each round of the
adversarial task. Additionally, in previous works,
authors have observed that classifiers struggle with
negations (Hosseini et al., 2017). This is borne
out by our data: examples from the single-turn ad-
versarial task more often contain the token “not”
than examples from the standard task, indicating
that users are easily able to fool the classifier with
negations.
We also anecdotally see figurative language
such as “snakes hiding in the grass” in the ad-
versarial data, which contain no individually of-
fensive words, the offensive nature is captured by
reading the entire sentence. Other examples re-
quire sophisticated world knowledge such as that
many cultures consider eating cats to be offen-
sive. To quantify these differences, we performed
a blind human annotation of a sample of the data,
100 examples of standard and 100 examples of ad-
versarial round 1. Results are shown in Table 3.
Adversarial data was indeed found to contain less
profanity, fewer non-profane but offending words
(such as “idiot”), more figurative language, and to
require more world knowledge.
We note that, as anticipated, the task becomes
more challenging for the crowdworkers with each
round, indicated by the decreasing average scores
in Table 7. In round 1, workers are able to get past
A0 most of the time – earning an average score
of 4.56 out of 5 points per round – showcasing
how susceptible this baseline is to adversarial at-
1https://github.com/LDNOOBW/List-of-Dirty-Naughty-
Obscene-and-Otherwise-Bad-Words
Single-Turn Multi
Round 1 2 3 (“4”)
Avg. score (0-5) 4.56 2.56 1.6 2.89
Table 7: Adversarial data collection worker scores.
Workers received a score out of 5 indicating how often
(out of 5 rounds) they were able to get past our clas-
sifiers within two tries. In later single-turn rounds it is
harder to defeat our models, but switching to multi-turn
makes this easier again as new attacks can be found by
using the dialogue context.
tack despite its relatively strong performance on
the Wikipedia Toxic Comments task. By round
3, however, workers struggle to trick the system,
earning an average score of only 1.6 out of 5. A
finer-grained assessment of the worker scores can
be found in Table 11 in the appendix.
5.2.2 Fix it Phase
Results comparing the performance of models
trained on the adversarial (Ai) and standard (Si)
tasks are summarized in Table 6, with further re-
sults in Table 13 in Appendix A.2. The adversar-
ially trained models Ai prove to be more robust
to adversarial attack: on each round of adversarial
testing they outperform standard models Si.
Further, note that the adversarial task becomes
harder with each subsequent round. In particu-
lar, the performance of the standard models Si
rapidly deteriorates between round 1 and round
2 of the adversarial task. This is a clear indi-
cation that models need to train on adversarially-
collected data to be robust to adversarial behavior.
Standard models (Si), trained on the standard
data, tend to perform similarly to the adversarial
models (Ai) as measured on the standard test sets,
with the exception of training round 3, in which
A3 fails to improve on this task, likely due to be-
ing too optimized for adversarial tasks. The stan-
dard models Si, on the other hand, are improving
with subsequent rounds as they have more training
data of the same distribution as the evaluation set.
Similarly, our baseline model performs best on its
own test set, but other models are not far behind.
Finally, we remark that all scores of 0 in Table
6 are by design, as for round i of the adversarial
task, both A0 and Ai−1 classified each example as
SAFE during the ‘break it’ data collection phase.
6 Multi-Turn Task
In most real-world applications, we find that ad-
versarial behavior occurs in context – whether it
is in the context of a one-on-one conversation, a
comment thread, or even an image. In this work
we focus on offensive utterances within the con-
text of two-person dialogues. For dialogue safety
we posit it is important to move beyond classify-
ing single utterances, as it may be the case that
an utterance is entirely innocuous on its own but
extremely offensive in the context of the previous
dialogue history. For instance, “Yes, you should
definitely do it!” is a rather inoffensive message
by itself, but most would agree that it is a hurtful
response to the question “Should I hurt myself?”
6.1 Task Implementation
To this end, we collect data by asking crowdwork-
ers to try to “beat” our best single-turn classifier
(using the model that performed best on rounds 1-
3 of the adversarial task, i.e., A3), in addition to
our baseline classifier A0. The workers are shown
truncated pieces of a conversation from the Con-
vAI2 chit-chat task, and asked to continue the con-
versation with OFFENSIVE responses that our clas-
sifier marks as SAFE. As before, workers have
two attempts per conversation to try to get past
the classifier and are shown five conversations per
round. They are given a score (out of five) at the
end of each round indicating the number of times
they successfully fooled the classifier.
We collected 3000 offensive examples in this
manner. As in the single-turn set up, we com-
bine this data with SAFE examples with a ratio
of 9:1 SAFE to OFFENSIVE for classifier training.
The safe examples are dialogue examples from
ConvAI2 for which the responses were reviewed
by two independent crowdworkers and labeled as
SAFE, as in the s single-turn task set-up. We refer
to this overall task as the multi-turn adversarial
task. Dataset statistics are given in Table 9.
6.2 Models
To measure the impact of the context, we train
models on this dataset with and without the given
context. We use the fastText and the BERT-based
model described in Section 3. In addition, we
build a BERT-based model variant that splits the
last utterance (to be classified) and the rest of the
history into two dialogue segments. Each segment
is assigned an embedding and the input provided
to the transformer is the sum of word embedding
and segment embedding, replicating the setup of
the Next Sentence Prediction that is used in the
training of BERT (Devlin et al., 2018).
6.3 Experimental Results
6.3.1 Break it Phase
During data collection, we observed that workers
had an easier time bypassing the classifiers than in
the single-turn set-up. See Table 7. In the single-
turn set-up, the task at hand gets harder with each
round – the average score of the crowdworkers de-
creases from 4.56 in round 1 to 1.6 in round 3. De-
spite the fact that we are using our best single-turn
classifier in the multi-turn set-up (A3), the task be-
comes easier: the average score per round is 2.89.
This is because the workers are often able to use
contextual information to suggest something of-
fensive rather than say something offensive out-
right. See examples of submitted messages in Ta-
ble 8. Having context also allows one to express
something offensive more efficiently: the mes-
sages supplied by workers in the multi-turn setting
were significantly shorter on average, see Table 4.
6.3.2 Fix it Phase
During training, we multi-tasked the multi-turn
adversarial task with the Wikipedia Toxic Com-
ments task as well as the single-turn adversarial
and standard tasks. We average the results of our
best models from five different training runs. The
results of these experiments are given in Table 10.
As we observed during the training of our base-
lines in Section 3, the fastText model architec-
ture is ill-equipped for this task relative to our
BERT-based architectures. The fastText model
performs worse given the dialogue context (an
average of 23.56 OFFENSIVE-class F1 relative
Multi-Turn Adversarial Task Examples
Context [P1:] greetings and salutations my friend
[P2:] hi how are you doing?
[P1:] i’m well. enjoying some r r from the navy station
[P2:] i love to cook. do you cook?
[P1:] i do on occasion. i love to read more though.
OFFENSIVE Response [P2:] reading the menu doesnt count
Context [P1:] hey how are you
[P2:] good but i keep thinking about the time i almost played for nba
[P1:] aww why did not you play
[P2:] lost my nerve i guess. what do you do?
[P1:] oh that’s to bad. i work at a gas station
OFFENSIVE Response [P2:] i need to follow my dream to not work in a gas station
Table 8: Examples from the multi-turn adversarial task. Responses can be offensive only in context.
Multi-Turn Adversarial Task Train Valid Test
SAFE Examples 21,600 2,700 2,700
OFFENSIVE Examples 2,400 300 300
Total Examples 24,000 3,000 3,000
Table 9: Multi-turn adversarial task data statistics.
Multi-Turn Adversarial Task Results
F1 Weighted-F1
fastText
with context 23.6 ± 1.9 85.9 ± 0.5
without context 37.1 ± 2.6 88.8 ± 0.6
BERT-based
(no segments)
with context 60.5 ± 1.3 92.2 ± 0.3
without context 56.8 ± 1.6 90.6 ± 0.7
BERT-based
(dialogue segments)
with context 66.4 ± 2.2 93.2 ± 0.4
without context 59.0 ± 2.5 91.2 ± 0.8
Table 10: Results of experiments on the multi-turn ad-
versarial task. We denote the average and one stan-
dard deviation from the results of five runs. Models that
use the context as input (“with context”) perform bet-
ter. Encoding this in the architecture as well (via BERT
dialogue segment features) gives us the best results.
to 37.1) than without, likely because its bag-of-
embeddings representation is too simple to take
the context into account.
We see the opposite with our BERT-based mod-
els, indicating that more complex models are able
to effectively use the contextual information to
detect whether the response is SAFE or OFFEN-
SIVE. With the simple BERT-based architecture
(that does not split the context and the utterance
into separate segments), we observe an average of
a 3.7 point increase in OFFENSIVE-class F1 with
the addition of context. When we use segments
to separate the context from the utterance we are
trying to classify, we observe an average of a 7.4
point increase in OFFENSIVE-class F1. Thus, it
appears that the use of contextual information to
identify OFFENSIVE language is critical to making
these systems robust, and improving the model ar-
chitecture to take account of this has large impact.
7 Conclusion
We have presented an approach to build more ro-
bust offensive language detection systems in the
context of a dialogue. We proposed a build it,
break it, fix it, and then repeat strategy, whereby
humans attempt to break the models we built, and
we use the broken examples to fix the models. We
show this results in far more nuanced language
than in existing datasets. The adversarial data in-
cludes less profanity, which existing classifiers can
pick up on, and is instead offensive due to figu-
rative language, negation, and by requiring more
world knowledge, which all make current classi-
fiers fail. Similarly, offensive language in the con-
text of a dialogue is also more nuanced than stand-
alone offensive utterances. We show that classi-
fiers that learn from these more complex examples
are indeed more robust to attack, and that using
the dialogue context gives improved performance
if the model architecture takes it into account.
In this work we considered a binary problem
(offensive or safe). Future work could consider
classes of offensive language separately (Zampieri
et al., 2019), or explore other dialogue tasks, e.g.
from social media or forums. Another interesting
direction is to explore how our build it, break it, fix
it strategy would similarly apply to make neural
generative models safe (Henderson et al., 2018).
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A Additional Experimental Results
A.1 Additional Break It Phase Results
Additional results regarding the crowdworkers’
ability to “beat” the classifiers are reported in Ta-
ble 11. In particular, we report the percent of mes-
sages sent by the crowdsource workers that were
marked SAFE and OFFENSIVE by both A0 and
Ai−1. We note that very infrequently (< 1% of
the time) a message was marked OFFENSIVE by
A0 but SAFE by Ai−1, showing that A0 was rela-
tively ineffective at catching adversarial behavior.
Single-Turn Multi
Round 1 2 3 (“4”)
Avg. score (0-5) 4.56 2.56 1.6 2.89
A0: OFFENSIVE and - 0.6% 0.8% 1.4%
Ai−1: SAFE
A0: SAFE and - 44.7% 64.9% 17.7%
Ai−1: OFFENSIVE
A0: OFFENSIVE and 25.7% 23.7% 16.1% 4.1%
Ai−1: OFFENSIVE
A0: SAFE and 74.3% 31.1% 18.3% 76.8%
Ai−1: SAFE
Table 11: Adversarial data collection statistics. A0
is the baseline model, trained on the Wikipedia Toxic
Comments dataset. Ai−1 is the model for round i,
trained on the adversarial data for rounds n ≤ i − 1.
In the case of the multi-turn set-up, Ai−1 is A3.
In Table 12, we report the categorization of ex-
amples into classes of offensive language from the
blind human annotation of round 1 of the single-
turn adversarial and standard data. We observe
that in the adversarial set-up, there were fewer ex-
amples of bullying language but more examples
targeting a protected class.
A.2 Additional Fix It Phase Results
We report F1, precision, and recall for the OFFEN-
SIVE class, as well as weighted-F1 for models Si
and Ai on the single-turn standard and adversar-
ial tasks in Table 13.
B Data Collection Interface Details
During the adversarial data collection, we asked
users to generate a message that “[the user be-
lieves] is not ok but that our system marks as ok,”
using the definition of “ok” and “not ok” described
in the paper (i.e. “ok to send in a friendly conver-
sation with someone you just met online”).
In order to generate a variety of responses, dur-
ing the single-turn adversarial collection, we pro-
vided users with a topic to base their response on
50% of the time. The topics were pulled from
a set of 1365 crowd-sourced open-domain dia-
logue topics. Example topics include diverse top-
ics such as commuting, Gouda cheese, music festi-
vals, podcasts, bowling, and Arnold Schwarzeneg-
ger.
Users were able to earn up to five points per
round, with two tries for each point (to allow them
to get a sense of the models’ weaknesses). Users
were informed of their score after each message,
and provided with bonuses for good effort. The
points did not affect the user’s compensation, but
rather, were provided as a way of gamifying the
data collection, as this has been showed to increase
data quality (Yang et al., 2018).
Please see an example image of the chat inter-
face in Figure 2.
Single-Turn Adversarial and Standard Task OFFENSIVE Examples (Round 1)
protected non-protected
class class bullying sexual violent
Standard 16% 18% 60% 8% 10%
Adversarial 25% 16% 28% 14% 15%
Table 12: Human annotation of 100 examples from each the single-turn standard and adversarial (round 1) tasks
into offensive classes.
Figure 2: User interface for the single-turn adversarial collection.
Baseline model Standard models Adversarial models
A0 S1 S2 S3 A1 A2 A3
Wikipedia Toxic Comments
f1 83.37 80.56 81.11 82.07 81.33 78.86 78.02
prec 85.29 81.18 78.37 82.17 78.55 73.27 71.35
recall 81.53 79.95 84.05 81.97 84.3 85.37 86.07
weighted f1 96.73 96.15 96.17 96.44 96.21 95.6 95.38
Standard Task
Round 1
f1 67.43 82.8 85.57 87.31 82.07 84.11 81.42
prec 78.67 89.53 85.15 88.66 77.68 78.95 73.02
recall 59.0 77.0 86.0 86.0 87.0 90.0 92.0
weighted f1 93.93 96.69 97.11 97.48 96.29 96.7 96.01
Round 2
f1 71.59 87.1 87.44 91.84 81.95 85.17 82.51
prec 82.89 94.19 87.88 93.75 80.0 81.65 74.8
recall 63.0 81.0 87.0 90.0 84.0 89.0 92.0
weighted f1 94.69 97.52 97.49 98.38 96.34 96.96 96.28
Round 3
f1 65.0 79.77 84.32 84.66 85.0 86.7 87.5
prec 86.67 91.03 91.76 89.89 85.0 85.44 84.26
recall 52.0 71.0 78.0 80.0 85.0 88.0 91.0
weighted f1 93.76 96.2 96.99 97.02 97 97.32 97.44
All rounds
f1 68.1 83.27 85.81 87.97 82.98 85.3 83.71
prec 82.46 91.6 88.07 90.78 80.76 81.9 77.03
recall 58.0 76.33 83.67 85.33 85.33 89.0 91.67
weighted f1 94.14 96.81 97.2 97.63 96.54 96.99 96.57
Adversarial Task
Round 1
f1 0.0 51.7 69.32 68.64 71.79 79.02 78.18
prec 0.0 80.85 80.26 84.06 73.68 77.14 71.67
recall 0.0 38.0 61.0 58.0 70.0 81.0 86.0
weighted f1 84.46 91.72 94.27 94.26 94.44 95.75 95.39
Round 2
f1 0.0 10.81 26.36 31.75 0.0 64.41 62.1
prec 0.0 54.55 58.62 76.92 0.0 74.03 65.56
recall 0.0 6.0 17.0 20.0 0.0 57.0 59.0
weighted f1 84.61 86.36 88.07 89.04 84.2 93.33 92.63
Round 3
f1 0.0 12.28 17.09 13.67 32.12 0.0 59.88
prec 0.0 50.0 58.82 47.06 59.46 0.0 74.63
recall 0.0 7.0 10.0 8.0 22.0 0.0 50.0
weighted f1 84.86 86.46 87.07 86.54 88.72 84.51 92.7
All rounds
f1 0.0 27.42 41.71 41.75 40.62 55.53 67.59
prec 0.0 70.83 72.13 76.79 60.13 46.0 65.0
weighted f1 84.64 88.42 90.2 90.31 89.7 91.94 93.66
Table 13: Full table of results from experiments on the single-turn standard and adversarial tasks. F1, precision,
and recall are reported for the OFFENSIVEclass, as well as weighted F1.
